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Abstract—Base station clustering is necessary in large inter-
ference networks, where the channel state information (CSI)
acquisition overhead otherwise would be overwhelming. In this
paper, we propose a novel long-term throughput model for the
clustered users which addresses the balance between interference
mitigation capability and CSI acquisition overhead. The model
only depends on statistical CSI, thus enabling long-term cluster-
ing. Based on notions from coalitional game theory, we propose
a low-complexity distributed clustering method. The algorithm
converges in a couple of iterations, and only requires limited
communication between base stations. Numerical simulations
show the viability of the proposed approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Multicell coordinated precoding [1], of which interference
alignment (IA) [2] is a particular kind, is a promising tech-
nique for achieving high cell-edge rates in future 5G networks.
Large sum rate gains are possible by exploiting the spatial
separability of the receivers, but this requires channel state
information at the transmitters (CSI-T). For frequency-division
duplex systems, the feedback load for obtaining the CSI-T
scales quadratically with the number of transmitters partaking
in the coordinated operation. This holds both for analog and
digital feedback. At finite signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs), only
strong interferers matter however. Due to the CSI acquisition
overhead incurred, it is therefore not worthwhile to coordinate
all transmitters in large networks [3]. Base station clustering is
an approach for balancing the substantial interference mitiga-
tion ability of large clusters with the correspondingly high CSI
acquisition overhead. Existing work on base station clustering
using IA includes [4], where a graph partitioning problem
was formulated based on fixed edge weights calculated from
statistical CSI. Contrary to our work, it is however unclear if
the model can modified to directly incorporate the effect of
CSI acquisition overhead. In [5], the CSI acquisition overhead
was modelled using a rate pre-log factor, which was then used
to formulate heuristic algorithms for base station grouping in
orthogonal time slots. We use a similar overhead model, but
assume full spectral reuse. Static base station clustering for
hexagonal cells was studied in [6]. In [7], a coalitional game
in partition form was used for femtocell clustering. The CSI
acquisition overhead was modelled in terms of transmission
power which, due to a total power constraint, limited the
amount of power left for data transmission.
Our contribution is a novel model for the users’ long-term
throughputs assuming IA precoding within the clusters, and
an accompanying base station clustering algorithm based on
coalition formation [8]. The proposed throughput model takes
into account the trade-off between interference mitigation abil-
ity and CSI acquisition overhead. By formulating a coalitional
game in partition form [8], the low-complexity distributed
coalition formation algorithm is devised. Although the system
is developed assuming IA, the resulting base station clustering
can be combined with any other precoding method. Despite its
low complexity, the proposed approach performs remarkably
well in our numerical simulation.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We study a frequency-division duplex network composed
of K base stations (BSs), each serving a single mobile station
(MS). We index the BS/MS-pairs (which we will call users)
using the set K = {1, 2, . . . ,K}. All BSs use the same time
and frequency resources for serving their respective MSs,
and the interference channel (IC) is thus used as the model
for the physical layer. The interference created is handled
by coordinated precoding, enabled by the sharing of CSI-T
between cooperating BSs. The means of BS cooperation is
encoded in a coalition structure [8]:
Definition 1 (Coalition Structure). A coalition structure S =
{C1, C2, . . . , CP } is a partition of K into disjoint sets called
coalitions, such that ∅ 6= Cp ⊆ K and Cp ∩ Cq = ∅ for all
Cp, Cq ∈ S, p 6= q. Further,
⋃P
p=1 Cp = K. For a user k ∈ Cp,
we let Πk(S) = Cp map to its coalition.
The channel between BS l and MS k is denoted as
Hkl ∈ CNk×Ml . We consider the case when the elements of
Hkl are i.i.d. CN (0, γkl), where γkl describes the large-scale
fading. BS k sends a signal xk ∼ CN (0, Idk) to MS k, where
dk is the number of spatial data streams. For spatial interfer-
ence suppression, BS k uses a linear precoder Vk ∈ CMk×dk
and MS k uses a linear receive filter Uk ∈ CNk×dk . The
received signals are thus modelled as
yk =U
H
kHkkVkxk︸ ︷︷ ︸
desired signal
+UHk
∑
l∈Πk(S)\{k}
HklVlxl︸ ︷︷ ︸
intracoalition interference
+UHk
∑
l∈K\Πk(S)
HklVlxl︸ ︷︷ ︸
intercoalition interference
+ UHkzk︸ ︷︷ ︸
filtered noise
, ∀ k ∈ K.
It is our goal to design the coalition structure such that a good
trade-off between interference mitigation and CSI acquisition
overhead is achieved. In order to do so, we first derive a model
for the long-term throughputs of the MSs.
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of proposed system. Note that the statistical CSI acquisition does not necessarily need to be a discrete block, but could be performed
concurrently with system operation based on instantaneous CSI. As a rough approximation for intermediate MS mobility, the statistical CSI must be re-estimated
on the order of seconds, whereas the instantaneous CSI must be re-estimated on the order of milliseconds.
A. Long-Term Spectral Efficiency
The users in a coalition cooperate to completely remove all
intracoalition interference.
Assumption 1 (Intracoalition CSI Sharing). The users in a
coalition share their local instantaneous CSI such that user
k has access to {Hkl}l∈Πk(S) and {Hlk}l∈Πk(S). All users
have access to full local statistical CSI (i.e. {γkl}l∈K and
{γlk}l∈K).
Assumption 2 (Intracoalition Interference Alignment). The
precoders {Vk}k∈K and receive filters {Uk}k∈K satisfy:
UHkHklVl = 0, ∀ k, l ∈ Πk(S), l 6= k, (1)
rank
(
UHkHkkVk
)
= dk, ∀ k ∈ Πk(S). (2)
Note that (1)–(2) can only be satisfied if IA is feasible
[9] for all coalitions in S. IA is well-known to achieve the
maximum degrees of freedom1 of the interference channel
[2] when there is no uncoordinated interference. Unless it is
feasible for all users to join a single coalition, the so called
grand coalition Sgrand = {K}, the remaining non-aligned
intercoalition interference will reduce the degrees of freedom
to zero. With a well-designed coalition structure however, a
major portion of the interference power will correspond to
intracoalition interference, which can be aligned and removed
using IA. The resulting high-SNR performance will then only
be limited by intercoalition interference. To formulate the
corresponding long-term spectral efficiencies, we require some
conditions on the IA solution.
Assumption 3 (Properties of IA Solution). For the IA solution
satisfying Assumption 2, the following holds for all k ∈ K:
A3.1 Uk and Vk do not depend on Hkl for all l ∈ K\Πk(S)
A3.2 Vk does not depend on the direct channel Hkk
A3.3 Vk is scaled semi-unitary (i.e. VHkVk =
Pk
dk
Idk )
A3.4 Uk is semi-unitary (i.e. UHkUk = Idk ) and designed
such that uHk,nHkkvk,m = 0 for m 6= n
Assumption 3.1 does not contradict Assumption 2. Assump-
tion 3.2 holds for any IA method that aims to only directly
satisfy (1), while relying on (2) being satisfied with probability
1. This is the case for e.g. the leakage minimization algorithm
[10], when applied to i.i.d. Rayleigh channels. Assumption 3.3
1The degrees of freedom of the interference channel can be seen as the
number of interference-free data streams that can successfully be transmitted
in the network, or equivalently as the pre-log factor of the sum capacity.
does not restrict the feasibility of IA [9], and any IA solution
can be transformed such that Assumption 3.4 holds [11].
Given an IA solution satisfying Assumption 3, the effective
channels can be characterized using the following lemma
(partially inspired by Lemma 1 in [11]).
Lemma 1. The effective desired channel for the nth stream
of MS k is
h¯k,n = u
H
k,nHkkvk,n ∼ CN (0, γkkPk/dk) . (3)
The intercoalition effective interfering channel between the
mth stream of BS l to the nth stream of MS k is
h˜kl,nm = u
H
k,nHklvl,m ∼ CN (0, γklPl/dl) . (4)
Proof: Due to the bi-unitary invariance of Hkk [12],
together with Assumptions 3.2 and 3.3, each element of
Hkkvk,n is i.i.d. CN (0, γkkPk/dk). Due to Assumption 3.4,
uk,n is orthonormal and independent of Hkkvk,n, and to-
gether with the bi-unitary invariance of Hkkvk,n, (3) follows.
Equation (4) follows similarly, except that Assumption 3.1 is
applied for the independence between uk,n, Hkl and vl,m.
Following Assumption 2, the intracoalition interference is
cancelled and the resulting received signal for the nth stream
of MS k can be written as
yk,n = h¯k,nxk,n +
∑
l∈K\Πk(S)
dl∑
m=1
h˜kl,nmxjl,m + z¯k,n, (5)
where z¯k,n = uHk,nzk ∼ CN
(
0, σ2k
)
. The long-term spectral
efficiency for MS k is now given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1. If the intercoalition interference is treated as
noise in a nearest neighbour decoder, the long-term spectral
efficiency for MS k is
rk(S) = dke1/ρk(S)E1 (1/ρk(S)) ,
where ρk(S) = γkkPk/dk∑
l∈K\Πk(S) γklPl+σ
2
k
is the per-stream SNR
and E1 (ξ) =
∫∞
ξ
t−1e−t dt is the exponential integral.2
Proof: Under Assumption 1, {h¯k,n}n=1,...,dk are known
to MS k, but {h˜kl,nm}l∈K\Πk(S),n=1,...,dk,m=1,...,dl are un-
known. Due to the construction of the decoder, and since xk
is Gaussian, the intercoalition interference plays the role of
2The function E1(ξ) can be calculated numerically, e.g. by summing its
truncated power series expansion [13, 5.1.11].
rk,n(S) = Eh¯k,n log
1 + ∣∣h¯k,n∣∣2
E{h˜kl,nm}
∑
l∈K\Πk(S)
∑dl
m=1
∣∣∣h˜kl,nm∣∣∣2 + σ2k
 = Eh¯k,n log
(
1 +
∣∣h¯k,n∣∣2∑
l∈K\Πk(S) γklPl + σ
2
k
)
(6)
additional Gaussian noise [14]. Given Lemma 1, the achievable
spectral efficiency for the nth stream of MS k can then be
written as in (6), at the top of the page. Integrating by parts,
it can be shown that the right hand side of (6) equivalently is
rk,n(S) = e1/ρk(S)E1 (1/ρk(S)), and the result follows.
B. CSI Acquisition Overhead and Long-Term Throughput
Under block fading, with coherence time Tc [s] and co-
herence bandwidth Wc [Hz], the coherence block length is
Lcoh = TcWc [3]. Within each coherence block, the instan-
taneous CSI must be re-acquired (cf. Fig. 1). As a model for
the corresponding cost3 in terms of lost temporal degrees of
freedom, we multiply the spectral efficiency with a pre-log
factor α(S), such that the long-term throughput for MS k is
tk (S) =
{
α (S) rk (S) if IA is feasible for Πk(S)
0 otherwise
. (7)
With LCSICp being the number of symbol intervals required for
CSI acquisition in coalition Cp, we model the pre-log factor
as α(S) = 1 −
∑P
p=1 L
CSI
Cp
Lcoh since, in order to not interfere,
the coalitions must perform CSI acquisition orthogonally.
Assuming pilot-assisted channel training and analog feedback
[11], the minimum number of symbol intervals needed for the
CSI-T acquisition within coalition Cp can be modelled4 as
[15]:
LCSICp =
∑
k∈Cp
Mk︸ ︷︷ ︸
DL training
+
∑
k∈Cp
Nk︸ ︷︷ ︸
UL training
+
∑
k∈Cp
∑
l∈Cp
Ml︸ ︷︷ ︸
analog feedback
+
∑
k∈Cp
dk.︸ ︷︷ ︸
DL effective ch. training
For large coalitions, the dominating term in LCSICp will be
the analog feedback term, which grows quadratically in the
cardinality of the coalition |Cp|.
Given IA feasibility, the grand coalition Sgrand will max-
imize rk (S) for all k ∈ K. Similarly, the coalition struc-
ture Ssingletons = {{1}, {2}, . . . , {K}} of singleton coalitions
will maximize α (S). Neither of these extremes is generally
optimal, and our goal is thus to find a distributed and low-
complexity trade-off between these. For this, we use the
framework of coalitional games.
III. COALITIONAL GAME
Coalitional games model cooperation between rational play-
ers [8]. A coalition between a set of players forms whenever
they can take joint actions which lead to mutual benefits. Since
3Relative to the cost of instantaneous CSI acquisition, we assume that the
cost of statistical CSI acquisition is negligible.
4This is under the assumption that
∑
k∈CpMk ≥ Nl, ∀ l ∈ Cp, such that
each channel matrix fed back can be successfully jointly estimated at the BSs
in Cp [11]. A sufficient condition for this to hold is if Mk ≥ Nl, ∀ k, l ∈ K.
the long-term throughput of each user depends on the whole
coalition structure, it is suitable to study the coalitional game
in partition form [8]. We formulate the game associated with
our setting as 〈K, {bk}k∈K, {t˜k}k∈K〉. Each player in K has a
history set Hk which includes the coalitions it has belonged
to in the past, as well as a communication budget bk ∈ N
which limits the number of times it can communicate with
other coalitions. With these definitions, we let the utility of a
player k in the game be
t˜k(S;Hk, ηk) =
{
tk(S) if Πk(S) /∈ Hk and ηk ≤ bk
0 otherwise
, (8)
which is the long-term throughput tk(S) in (7) with two
restrictions: (i) a player does not profit by joining a coalition
it has been member of before, and (ii) a player k should not
exhaust its communication budget ηk ≤ bk where ηk ∈ N is
the number of times player k has already communicated with
another coalition to ask for cooperation.
A. Coalition Formation
Coalition formation describes the dynamics which lead to
stable coalition structures. We will specify the elements which
are required to formulate the coalition formation game by
using a coalition formation model from [16]. In this model,
only a single player is allowed to deviate and leave its coalition
to join another. A player can join a new coalition only if
all members of the coalition accept him. Such a coalition
formation model has been used, e.g. in [17] in the context
of cognitive radio settings.
Definition 2 (Deviation). A player k ∈ K leaves Πk(S) to join
T ∈ S ∪ {∅}. Consequently, the coalition structure changes
to ST . We capture this change by the notation ST k←− S .
A deviation is admissible if the player as well as the
members of the coalition it wants to join improve their payoff.
Definition 3 (Admissible Deviation). A deviation ST k←− S
is admissible if t˜k(ST ;Hk, ηk) > t˜k(S;Hk, ηk), and
t˜l(ST ;Hl, ηl) ≥ t˜l(S;Hl, ηl), for all players l ∈ T .
The rational players will pursue admissible deviations.
Definition 4 (Individual Stability). A coalition structure S is
individually stable if there exists no player k ∈ K and coalition
T such that ST k←− S is admissible.
Relying on the deviation model and stability concept we
formulate the coalition formation algorithm in Algorithm 1.
The initial coalition structure is the grand coalition, but the
algorithm could be initialized in any other coalition structure.
Algorithm 1 Coalition Formation for Base Station Clustering
Initialize: i = 1, S(1) = Sgrand, Hk = ∅, ηk = 0, k ∈ K
1: repeat
2: loop over k sequentially from K
3: loop in a greedy order over all T ∈ Ψk(S(i))
4: Increment search factor ηk = ηk + 1
5: if deviation ST k←− S is admissible then
6: Update S(i+1) = S(i)T
7: Update Hk = Hk ∪Πk(S(i))
8: Go to line 12
9: end if
10: end loop
11: i = i+ 1
12: end loop
13: until no player deviated
Based on the current coalition structure S(i), player k can
calculate its acceptable coalitions as
Ψk(S) = {T ∈ S ∪ {∅} | t˜k(ST ;Hk, ηk) > t˜k(S;Hk, ηk)}.
The utilities in the acceptable coalitions are stored in decreas-
ing order such that player k can greedily select coalitions
which provide the highest utility first. After incrementing the
index ηk on line 4, player k tests if joining the coalition
T is strictly profitable for him. If this is the case, it asks
the members of coalition T for permission to join. Here,
we assume that the players are able to communicate for this
purpose. Each player in the coalition can calculate its utility
locally and communicate its decision with the others in the
coalition. If all members of coalition T accept player k, then
the deviation is admissible. The coalition structure changes
(line 6) after player k leaves its coalition to join the new one.
The history set of player k is updated on line 7 to include the
previous coalition it was member of. The coalition formation
stops when no deviations are admissible.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 converges to an individually stable
coalition structure. The number of iterations is upper bounded
by the minimum of
∑
k∈K bk and the Kth Bell number.
Proof: Convergence is guaranteed due to the restrictions
imposed through the history set and communication budget in
(8). Each player k can change coalitions a maximum of bk
times. Thus the maximum number of iterations is
∑
k∈K bk.
However, if the budget constraints are large enough, the worst
case number of iterations is limited by the number of partitions
of K, which is the Kth Bell number [17, Proof of Thm. 1].
The stability result follows from iterating over all deviation
possibilities until no admissible deviations remain.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate the performance of the proposed approach by
means of numerical simulations. The source code is made
available at [18]. The simulation parameters are inspired by
3GPP Case 2 [19]. We consider a scenario where K BSs
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Fig. 2. Results with IA precoding in the (6× 12, 1)8 IC.
and K MSs are placed uniformly at random in a square,
whose dimensions are selected such that the average cell
size is identical to that of a deployment where the BSs have
hexagonal cells with an apothem of 250 m [19]. A greedy user
association algorithm is applied, associating one MS with each
BS. We consider symmetric networks where all BSs have M
antennas, all MSs have N antennas and are served d = 1 data
streams each. We use the notation (N ×M,d)K to refer to
such a network [9]. We assume a bandwidth of 10 MHz and a
carrier frequency of fc = 2 GHz, such that the pathloss model
PLdB = 15.3 + 3.76 log10 (distance[m]) is relevant [19].
Log-normal i.i.d. shadow fading with a standard deviation of
8 dB is used for all channels, and the small-scale fading is
i.i.d. Rayleigh fading. The coherence bandwidth is assumed
to be Wc = 300 kHz, and the noise power spectral density is
−174 dBm/Hz together with a receiver noise figure of 9 dB.
We generate 500 independent realizations of the BS/MS
positions and given each position realization, we generate 5 in-
dependent small-scale fading realizations. System performance
is evaluated in terms of the sum throughput tsum =
∑
k∈K tk.
Algorithm 1 is compared to the k-means based algorithm in
[4], since it outperforms the other algorithms of [4]. For bench-
marking, we also compare to the global optimum obtained
by exhaustive search (for small K), the case of randomly
generated coalitions, as well as the previously defined Sgrand
and Ssingletons coalition structures. Three networks are studied:
1) (6 × 12, 1)8 IC: In this scenario, IA is feasible [9] for
the grand coalition due to the excess of antennas. We vary the
MS speed—thus varying Lcoh—and provide the resulting long-
term sum throughput in Fig. 2. At low speeds, the coherence
block length is large, and the grand coalition is optimal since
there this a lot of time to spend on CSI acquisition. At
high speeds, the grand coalition throughput is zero, since
there is not enough time to satisfy the CSI acquisition needs.
Algorithm 1 is able to smoothly transition between the grand
coalition and the singleton coalitions.
2) (2 × 4, 1)8 IC: We contrast the previous scenario with
an IA infeasible scenario, where the grand coalition will have
zero sum throughput under IA precoding. For an MS speed of
30 km/h [19], corresponding to a coherence block length of
Lcoh = 2700 symbols, the long-term sum throughput is shown
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in Fig. 3. Algorithm 1 is outperforming all benchmarks except
exhaustive search, whose shape it is able to follow. The k-
means based algorithm of [4] is not performing particularly
well, the reason being that it may result in coalitions that are
not strictly IA feasible.
3) (2 × 4, 1)16 IC: For this larger network, we evaluate
performance in terms of instantaneous sum throughput after
precoding. We use a modified version of the WMMSE al-
gorithm [20], where the coloured noise of the intercoalition
interference is replaced with white noise with equal average
power. This can be shown to lead to a robust and convergent
algorithm, but due to space reasons we leave out the details.
The results are shown in Fig. 4, where it can be seen that
Algorithm 1 outperforms the benchmarks. Since the k-means
based algorithm is not able to capture the CSI acquisition
overhead being a function of the coalition sizes, it performs
slightly worse. In Fig. 5, we see that Algorithm 1 can adapt the
coalition sizes, while still only using a couple of deviations.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a long-term throughput model for
base station clustering using IA and an accompanying low-
complexity distributed algorithm based on coalition formation.
The numerical results show the importance of treating both
spectral efficiency as well as CSI acquisition overhead when
tackling the base station clustering problem.
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